Interesting, Potentially Significant Decision From Michigan Supreme Court

The Detroit Free Press reports a potentially significant recent decision from the Michigan Supreme Court that struck down a legal standard that allowed plaintiffs to be distinguished on the basis of race.

The lawsuit was filed by Michael Lind, a white officer who alleged reverse discrimination occurred when the Battle Creek Police Department promoted a black officer who scored lower on written and oral exams than Lind.

The trial court and Michigan Court of Appeals ruled against Lind … [using] a legal test that required a person claiming reverse discrimination to prove that the employer has an unusual background of discriminating against majority groups.

But the state’s highest court overturned those decisions.

The Michigan Civil Rights Act “draws no distinction between individual plaintiffs on account of race,” Justice Stephen Markman wrote for the majority….

But the court’s decision drew sharp rebukes from dissenting Justices Michael Cavanagh and Marilyn Kelly.

“In our society, demeaning acts of prejudice directed against whites because of their race are uncommon,” Kelly wrote in arguing that distinctions based on race are justified.

But Robert Young, the court’s lone black justice, questioned what he called the dissenters’ “Orwellian racial policy preferences” and argued that no citizen should be more equal than another.

The article quotes Glen Lenhoff, a Flint employment discrimination expert, who described the opinion as the most “socially significant” in years and said it could pave the way to challenging racial preferences in university admissions in Michigan.

“The Michigan judiciary has made it crystal clear that it will not allow reverse discrimination,” Lenhoff said. “I don’t see how (the court) could allow reverse discrimination in college admissions after this opinion.”

The dissenting justices’ effort to narrow the definition of discrimination to mean only “demeaning acts of prejudice” directed against individuals because of their race also reflects a long-standing effort to claim that racial preferences really don’t amount to discrimination against the un-preferred because they are not rooted in animus and do not revean an intention to stigmatize or demean. (Of course, these same defenders always reject this standard when others attempt to apply it to redistricting or disparate impact employment cases.)

Although the ruling may indeed be far-reaching, it is still not clear that Lind when his case is considered again in the lower courts. The city’s collective bargaining agreement says that when a position becomes available the city can choose from among its top five candidates. Lind ranked second based on oral and written exams and seniority. The Chief at the time hired a black patrolman who ranked fifth, explaining tht he liked his “maturity and sense of duty to the department.” An Asian scored first.

Say What? (2)

  1. Alex Bensky June 12, 2004 at 11:06 pm | | Reply

    It’s probably true that acts of discrimination are less common against members of the majority racial group. That makes such acts OK then, apparently. It seems that Justice Kelly is a subscriber to the Matsuda Doctrine, named after law professor Mari Matsuda, which states that racial discrimination is bad only against certain groups, and is progressive against others.

  2. John Rosenberg June 13, 2004 at 2:21 am | | Reply

    Alex – Mari Matsuda is rather far out, but it seems to me that anyone who believes in what is often called “positive discrimination,” i.e., discrimination on behalf of minorities/the underrepresented/etc., or, for that matter, racial preferences must believe that discrimination against members of the majority group(s) is a Good Thing.

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