I hereby gratefully accept Joanne Jacobs’ modification of my term,
Ubiquitous Non Sequitur, to the much improved Iniquitous Ubiquitous Non Sequitur. The terms refer to the offensive (iniquitous) all-too-common (ubiquitous) argument that discrimination on the basis of race resides on the same moral and political plane — and thus should be legally treated the same — as discrimination on the basis of athletic or musical ability.
A reader, Dan Kevin, emailed the following comment:
Re the Iniquitous Ubiquitous Non Sequitur — that opponents of preferences in college admissions lack credibility because they do not criticize preferences extended to athletes, children of alumni, or to well-connected applicants in college admissions — besides the key point that legally (and morally), race is in a different category than these other preferences, here are three additional arguments:
– Even if opposition to race-based preferences was expanded to include other types of preferences, it is unlikely, to say the least, that affirmative action supporters would change their position on preferences in any way. Even if all institutions were to eliminate preferences for athletes, the children of alumni, and so on, it is certain that advocates of affirmative action would still maintain that preferences are appropriate for minorities. The main justifications for affirmative action — combating the effects of racism and increasing diversity — have nothing to do with whether or not preferences are extended to these other groups.
– These non-race-based preferences are not at issue in a wide range of circumstances. At least at schools with national reputations, while minority preferences are the norm, no law school or medical school and few graduate programs give preferences to athletes, for example.
– Even if there was general agreement that these other types of preferences are objectionable, it is not necessary to oppose all bad policies in order to oppose one bad policy. In fact, it usually is impossible to act on any one social ill if many ills must be combated simultaneously. Those who find racial preferences a more serious problem than other types of preferences are as entitled to select the focus of their efforts as are affirmative action advocates, who focus on combating white racism rather than racism on the part of other groups, world hunger, or other problems.
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I replied:
Re your first argument, the reason preferentialists think they have a “Gotcha!” with the non-race preferences is that they assume, incorrectly, that the only reason to oppose race preferences is a commitment to merit, and these other preferences compromise pure academic merit as well. But one can easily oppose race preferences because they are wrong, even if one is willing to accept compromises with pure merit for other reasons that are not inherently, or at least consitutionally, wrong.
In 1946, my father applied to the veterinary school at Cornell. The rejection letter made it clear that though he was academically qualified, they already had enough students “of his kind”. He ended up going to Michigan State and had a long, respected, career.
It seems that in 1946 my father, as a Jew, was not enough of a white European to get into an Ivy League school. His grandson may be considered too much of a white European to get into an Ivy League school.
According to the ‘logic’ of those supporting preferences, my father, like ‘white’ and ‘Asian’ students today, was not harmed by the system of preferences in place in 1946, because he ended up getting into another school.
It’s really pathetic to see smart people like those running the law school at Michigan, try to defend the indefensible. Of course, smart is smart and good is good and they’re not the same thing.